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U.S. Security Strategy:
Empowering Kim Jong-il?
ERIC SCHWARTZ*

I. INTRODUCTION

As the world's foremost superpower, the United States has
the unique ability to influence the behavior of other states. Since
the end of World War II, the United States has been the central
architect in creating and maintaining a global system of
international law and human rights. Generally, America has used
this global system to protect its own interests, but current U.S.
policies concerning preemptive self-defense and nuclear weapon
use are contrary to the international norms which the United
States itself helped to establish. These policies may have
unintentionally encouraged nuclear proliferation and inspired
North Korean Kim Jong-il to obtain nuclear weapons.
In the aftermath of 9/11, President Bush emphasized the
threat of "rogue states" developing weapons of mass destruction
(WMDs).' Iraq, Iran, and North Korea, formally called the
Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), were singled out
as members of the "axis of evil," 2 and the 2003 invasion of Iraq was
premised on disarming Iraq of its WMDs' In the face of U.S.
rhetoric warning against the development of WMDs, Kim Jong-il
continued his pursuit of nuclear weapons until he procured a
tentative deal after six-party talks in February 2007 to receive
thousands of tons of oil, humanitarian assistance, and the
* Attorney, Office of the General Counsel-Sempra Energy; J.D. (Loyola Law School Los
Angeles); B.A., International Relations (University of Southern California). I would like
to thank Professor David Glazier for all of his help and encouragement.
1. THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 15
(2002)
[hereinafter 2002 NATIONAL
SECURITY STRATEGY],
available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf.
2. President's State of the Union Address, 1 PUB. PAPERS 129 (Jan. 29, 2002),
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/0120020129-11.html.
3. U.N. SCOR, 58th Sess., 4701st mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc. S/PV.4701 (Feb. 5,2003).
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unfreezing of North Korean bank accounts 4 in exchange for closing
North Korea's nuclear facilities The status of North Korea's
remaining nuclear arsenal, however, is far from certain. As a Kim'
Jong-il spokesperson declared in the months after this deal was
brokered, "U.S. President George W. Bush [is] waving a white
flag, offering to allow the DPRK to retain its nuclear arsenal as it
is . . . . Kim Jong-il has built a nuclear-missile force capable of
blazing the remotest target on the U.S. mainland."6
North Korea has steadfastly pursued nuclear weapons under
Kim Jong-il's leadership. The United States accuses North Korea
of violating every nuclear treaty it has entered since 1992.7 U.S.
State Department spokesman Richard Boucher recently stated,
"North Korea's secret nuclear weapons program is a serious
violation of North Korea's commitments under the [1994] Agreed
Framework as well as under the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT),
its International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards agreement,
and the Joint North-South Declaration on the Denuclearization of
the Korean Peninsula." 8
Within the past decade, the DPRK has threatened
preemptive attack against the United States,9 test-fired missiles
towards Japan,' ° and tested a nuclear weapon in the face of
international protest.? In 2003, after North Korea withdrew from
the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), John Bolton, then
Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International
Security, declared, "[it is] hard to see how we can have
conversations with a government that has blatantly violated its

4. Q & A: North Korean Money in Macau, BBC NEWS, June 12, 2007,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/6723981.stm.
5. Media Note, U.S. Dep't of State, North Korea - Denuclearization Action Plan
(Feb. 13, 2007), availableat http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2007/february/80479.htm.
6. Kim Myong-chol, Op-Ed., Bush Waves a White Flag, ASIA TIMES, Feb. 16, 2007,
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Korea/IB16Dg02.html.
7. See Press Statement, Richard Boucher, U.S. Dep't of State, North Korean
Nuclear Program (Oct. 16, 2002) available at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2002/
14432.htm.
8. Id.
9. Yong Tiam Kui, Australia, N. Korea Join "Preemptive" Bandwagon, NEW
STRAITS TIMES, Oct. 26, 2003, at 4.
10. North Korea Test-fires 7th Missile, CNN, July 5, 2006, http://www.cnn.com/2006/
WORLD/asiapcf/07/05/korea.missile/index.html.
11. North Korea Claims Nuclear Test, BBC NEWS, Oct. 9, 2006,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/ asia-pacific/6032525.stm.
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agreements."' 2 Despite this history, the United States agreed to
terms in the February 2007 agreement that were almost identical
to the terms of the failed 1994 Agreed Framework.'3 North Korea
later violated its February 2007 agreement with the United4 States
by delaying the closure of its nuclear facility by two months.
The United States has taken the lead in imploring North
Korea to relinquish its nuclear weapons program in compliance
with its previous treaty obligations and international principles
regarding nuclear non-proliferation. President Bush credits North
Korea's nuclear posture with the DPRK's negative reputation
among the international community, declaring that "[t]he North
Korean regime will find respect in the world and revival for its
people only when it turns away from its nuclear ambitions."'"
Nevertheless, U.S. actions in the international community
may speak louder than its words. While imploring North Korea to
conform to established international norms, the United States has
ignored these same norms in its own security policies. In 2002,
President Bush withdrew from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty'6
and now advocates for the creation of a missile defense system.
Furthermore, the United States steadfastly maintains that nuclear
weapons may be employed during warfare, and it continues to
modernize its nuclear arsenal while ignoring its commitment to
disarm under the NPT.'" The Bush administration employed the
doctrine of preemptive self-defense in the war against Iraq without
UN approval. 9 Yet, the United States has declined to recognize

12. Philip Shenon, North Korea Says Nuclear Program Can Be Negotiated, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 3,2002, at Al.
13. Aiden Foster-Carter, Small Step on Long Road for N. Korea, BBC NEWS, July 18,
2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/6901861.stm.
14. See Media Note, U.S. Dep't of State, supra note 5; see also Foster-Carter, supra
note 13.
15. President's State of the Union Address, 1 PUB. PAPERS 82 (Jan. 28, 2003),
availableat http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/01/20030128-19.html.
16. President's Remarks Announcing the United States Withdrawal From the AntiBallistic Missile Treaty, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1510 (Dec. 13, 2001), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/12/print/20011213-4.html; see also Treaty
on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, U.S.-U.S.S.R., May 26, 1972, 23 U.S.T.
3435.

17. Surprise Offer Defuses U.S.-Russia Missile Spat, CNN, June 7, 2007,
http://www.cnn.com/2007/WORLD/europe/06/07/bush.putin/index.html.
18. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, opened for signature July 1,
1968, 21 U.S.T. 483,729 U.N.T.S. 161.
19. Iraq War Illegal, Says Annan, BBC NEWS, Sept. 16, 2004, http://news.bbc.co.uk/
I/hi/world/middleeast/3661134.stm.
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any other country's right to preemptive attack." Finally, the
United States has adopted policies for treating detainees that
violate the Third Geneva Convention. 2'
U.S. disregard for international norms has not gone unnoticed
in North Korea. In 2003, following President Bush's "axis of evil"
comments, North Korea withdrew from the NPT, citing its right to
launch a preemptive strike against the United States in selfdefense.2 North Korea has stated its belief that the only adequate
deterrence against a U.S. attack is nuclear development.
This Article explores whether the current U.S. nuclear
weapons posture and preemptive self-defense policy serve to
legitimize Kim Jong-il's pursuit of nuclear weapons. U.S. national
interests would be best served through nuclear and defense
policies that conform to international principles and treaties. Part
II examines the origins of the Bush administration's policy of
preemptive self-defense and the unintended consequences of its
application in Iraq. Part III considers self-defense in the context of
international law and the UN's rejection of the doctrine of
preemptive self-defense as a justification for war (the Bush
Doctrine). Part IV analyzes the U.S. military's acknowledgement
of international law regarding nuclear weapons and examines
current U.S. policy legitimizing the use of nuclear weapons.
Finally, Part V looks at North Korea's pursuit of nuclear weapons
and its reaction to U.S. policies regarding preemptive self-defense
and nuclear weapons.
II.

THE BUSH DOCTRINE OF PREEMPTIVE SELF-DEFENSE

George W. Bush was the first American president to fully and
openly endorse the doctrine of preemptive self-defense as a
justification for war, the Bush Doctrine. In the 2002 National
Security Strategy of the United States, President Bush proclaimed:
20. See Ari Fleisher, White House Spokesman, Press Briefing (Oct. 15, 2002),
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/10/20021015-5.html.
21. Omar Akbar, Losing Geneva in Guantanamo Bay, 89 IOWA L. REV. 195, 197
(2003).
22. Foster-Carter, supra note 13; see also KCNA: DPRK "Nuclear Deterrent Force"
To Be Built If U.S. Maintains "Hostile Policy," KOREAN CENT. NEWS AGENCY, June 9,

2003, (translating Statement on Pyongyang Korean Central Broadcasting Station) (on file
with the Loyola of Los Angeles International & Comparative Law Review).
23. Id.
24. See Mary Ellen O'Connell, The Myth of Preemptive Self-Defense 15, 18 (Am.
Soc'y of Int'l Law [ASIL] Presidential Task Force on Terrorism, 2002), available at
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The greater the threat, the greater is the risk of inaction.

..

the

more compelling the case for taking anticipatory action to
defend ourselves, even if uncertainty remains as to the time and
place of the enemy's attack. To forestall or prevent such hostile
acts by our adversaries,
the United States will, if necessary, act
2
preemptively.
A. Preemptive Self-Defense
The Bush administration did not invent the doctrine of
preemptive self-defense. In response to terrorism, previous
administrations have expressed similar, but more limited, views on
this doctrine. In 2000, the Clinton administration released A
National Security Strategy for a Global Age, which stated, "[a]s
long as terrorists continue to target American citizens, we reserve
the right to act in self-defense by striking at their bases and those
who sponsor, assist, or actively support them, as we have done
over the years in different countries."26 The Reagan administration
also adopted a policy of preemption to address known terrorist
activities."
While President Bush is not the first president to advocate a
right of preemptive self-defense, the Bush Doctrine advocates the
most expansive claim of this right. The Bush administration's
interpretation of. preemptive self-defense asserts the right to
unilaterally, without international authorization, use military force
to halt development of a threat. Such a threat need not pose
imminent danger, but action is nevertheless authorized if ignoring
the threat could result in unacceptable dangers.29 These nonimminent threats include nation-states, not simply individual
terrorist groups.3° Previously, the United States found the law of

http://www.asil.org/taskforce/oconnell.pdf; see also David E. Sanger, Beating Them to the
Prewar,N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 2002, at B7.
25. 2002 NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY, supa note 1, at 15.

26.

A NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY FOR A GLOBAL AGE 23

(2000) [hereinafter

2000 NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY], available at http://www.globalsecurity.org/
military/library/policy/national/nss-0012.pdf.
27. See Extract of National Security Decision Directive No. 138, Preemptive Strikes
Against Suspected Terrorists, Apr. 3, 1984 [hereinafter Extract of NSDD 138], available at
http://www.gwu.edu/-nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB55/nsddl38.pdf. The full directive is
available at http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsdd/nsdd-138.htm.
28. See O'Connell, supra note 24, at 18.
29. 2002 NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY, supra note 1, at 15.
30. See id.
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force laid out in the UN Charter adequate to deal with threats to
security.'
Advocates of the Bush Doctrine contend that the
international system cannot protect the world from the threat of
rogue states such as North Korea obtaining and using nuclear
weapons.32 These advocates complain that under current
international law, "we end up hobbling ourselves with legalistic
restrictions against carrying the war ...to those who intend to do
us and our way of life severe harm, either now or in the not-[tooldistant future."33 A policy of preemptive attack claims to deter
potential enemies from developing nuclear weapons and signals
that the United States will not wait for an attack to employ its
military might.34 Accordingly, states which remain undeterred from
acquiring nuclear weapons risk preemptive attack.35
B. Unintended Consequences of the Bush Doctrine
Although the preemption doctrine seeks to improve U.S.
security against enemies who are impervious to the traditional
deterrent of mutual destruction, a broad application of the
preemptive self-defense policy actually serves to undermine
international security.36 Even such "hawkish" international realists
such as Secretary of State Henry Kissinger have declared that a
U.S. policy of preemptive self-defense could have negative security
consequences. Following the release of the 2002 National
Security Strategy, Kissinger stated:
As the most powerful nation in the world, the United States has
a special unilateral capacity to implement its convictions. But it
also has a special obligation to justify its actions by principles
that transcend the assertions of preponderant power. It cannot
be in either the American national interest or the world's
interest to develop principles that grant every nation an
31. See O'Connell, supra note 24, at 15.
32. Guy B. Roberts, The CounterproliferationSelf-Help Paradigm:A Legal Regime
for Enforcing the Norm Prohibitingthe Proliferationof Weapons of Mass Destruction, 27
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 483, 484 (1999).
33. Id. at 485-86.
34. 2002 NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY, supranote 1, at 15.
35. See Ashton B. Carter& William J. Perry, If Necessary, Strike and Destroy, WASH.
POST, June 22, 2006, at A29.
36. See Matthew Kapper, The Bush Doctrineand North Korea, 8 GONZ. J. INT'L L. 2,
4 (2004-05), availableat http://www.gonzagajil.org/pdf/volume8/Klapper/Klapper.pdf.
37. See Henry A. Kissinger, Consult and Control: Bywords for Battling the New
Enemy, WASH. POST, Sept. 16,2002, at A19.
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unfettered right of preemption against its own definition of
threats to its security.
The principle of preemptive self-defense has never been
expanded from the stringent requirement of a known imminent
attack, as set forth in the Caroline decision,39 perhaps because it is

too difficult to delineate when military action would not be
justified. A policy based on predicting future attack without any
evidentiary basis could4yroduce distrust and anarchy in the
international community.
Before the invasion of Iraq, the Bush administration
attempted to use preemption as a justification for military action.
In 2002, then-National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice tried to
limit the preemptive doctrine when she stated, "[t]he number of
cases in which [the preemptive doctrine] might be justified will
always be small. It does not give a green light - to the United
States or any other nation - to act first without exhausting other
means, including diplomacy.",4' Despite this statement, U.S. efforts
at diplomacy before undertaking military 42action in Iraq left much
of the international community suspicious.
In 2003, the United States ended diplomatic efforts and
employed its new, broader policy of preemptive self-defense
against Saddam Hussein. President Bush declared that Saddam
Hussein had refused to follow his UN non-proliferation
obligations and that he possessed WMDs. 43 The Bush
administration presented the UN Security Council with evidence
of Hussein's alleged WMD aspirations, but the Council declined to
authorize an invasion.44 Following the U.S. invasion of Iraq, no
38. Id.
39. See R.Y. Jennings, The Caroline and McLeod Cases, 32 AM. J. INT'L. L. 82, 82-92
(1938).
40. See generally George Perkovich, Bush's Nuclear Revolution: A Regime Change in
Nonproliferation,FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Mar./Apr. 2003, at 2.
41. Condoleezza Rice, U.S. Nat'l Sec. Advisor, Remarks at The Manhattan Institute
2002 Walter B. Wriston Lecture: Dr. Condoleezza Rice Discusses President's National
Security Strategy (Oct. 1, 2002), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/
2002/10/20021001-6.html.
42. See Iraq War Illegal, Says Annan, supra note 19.
43. George W. Bush, U.S. Pres., Saddam Hussein Must Leave Iraq Within 48 Hours,
Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation (Mar. 17, 2003), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/03/20030317-7.html.
44. See Richard W. Stevenson, Bush Gives Hussein 48 Hours, and Vows to Act, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 18, 2003, at Al; U.S., Britain and Spain Abandon Resolution, GLOBAL
POLICY FORUM, Mar. 17, 2003, http:/www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/iraq/attack/
armtwist/2003/0317usbritspain.htm.
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WMDs were ever found. Moreover, in 2004, the U.S. Report on
the U.S. Intelligence Community's Prewar Intelligence
Assessments on Iraq determined that much of the evidence
justifying the war was either presumptuous or false. 5
Common sense dictates that an inappropriate application of
preemptive self-defense would draw hostility and distrust from
other nations. In fact, the flawed evidence presented by the United
States illegitimatized the Iraq war in the eyes of the world 6
Because the doctrine of preemptive self-defense authorizes a state
to act without the threat of imminent attack and before any actual
warning of an attack, evidence plays a crucial role in evaluating the
existence of a serious threat. In this case, the evidence proved
faulty, contributing to the chaos and instability in Iraq.48
American credibility in the international community, an
essential commodity for a world leader, has been severely
damaged. 9 Following the preemptive attack on Iraq, antiAmerican sentiment has risen. ° Perceived
"American
exceptionalism," the idea that the United States applies one set of
rules to itself and another to the rest of the world, has created
international animosity, particularly in the Muslim world." A panel
chosen by the Bush administration reported that "[h]ostility
toward America has reached shocking levels" among Arabs and
Muslims abroad. 2
The preemptive self-defense doctrine is now viewed by some
around the world as nothing more than propaganda used to justify
U.S. global military actions while the United States pursues its
own political or economic interests.53 This sort of international
hostility is harmful to national security when combined with the
threat of preemptive attack. In the extreme, this environment
could arguably lead to nuclear war.
45. See generally S. SELECT COMM. ON INTELLIGENCE, REPORT ON THE U.S.
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY'S PREWAR INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENTS ON IRAQ, S. REP.

NO. 108-301 (2004), availableat http://www.gpoaccess.gov/serialset/creports/iraq.html.
46. See Steven R. Weisman, U.S. Must Counteract Image in Muslim World, Panel
Says, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 2003, at Al.
47. See Extract of NSDD 138, supra note 27.
48. S.REP. No. 108-301.

49. See Weisman, supra note 46, at Al.
50. Id.

51. Harold Hongju Koh, On American Exceptionalism, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1479, 1482
(2003).
52. Weisman, supra note 46, at Al.
53. See Extract of NSDD 138, supra note 27; see also Weisman, supra note 46, at Al.
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III. INTERNATIONAL LAW GOVERNING SELF-DEFENSE

Treaties and customs are the central tenets of international
law,54 and, particularly, the law of war. This section will examine
the origins of international law surrounding the doctrine of
preemptive self-defense in the form of customary law and treaties.
Treaties specifically enunciate the rights and duties of
signatory nations and provide a concrete point of analysis for
international law.55 Though treaties can illustrate international
ideals, the extent to which signatory states view their obligations
within a treaty as effective and binding often varies. 6 Treaties
often lack strong international enforcement, and nations often
interpret them expediently, as opposed to accurately."
Customary law provides a better indicator of a state's actual
behavior and is considered by some experts to be the nucleus of
international law. Customary law is derived from the consistent
practice of states over time and a sense of legal obligation.5 9
Modern scholars argue that the behavior of powerful states greatly
influences the behavior of weaker states.6° A large amount of
empirical data supports this contention.6'
Customary law is therefore highly influenced by the world's
hegemonic power, the United States. 62 Robert Keohane defines a
"hegemon" as a state that is "powerful enough to maintain the
essential rules governing interstate relations, and willing to do
SO.''63

The hegemon uses its power to influence international

institutions and laws to parallel its own interests. 64 When a
hegemon claims a new right or alters an existing right, it has a
considerable, if not dispositive, effect on the international system
and customary law. 6' Because the making of international law is
54. Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, A Theory of Customary InternationalLaw,
66 U. CHI. L. REV. 1113, 1116 (1999).

55. See Rachel Brewster, The Domestic Origins of InternationalAgreements, 44 V.A.
J. INT'L L. 501, 510 (2004).

56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

See id.
Brewster, supra note 55, at 515 n.34-35.
Goldsmith & Posner, supra note 54, at 1113.
Id. at 1116.
Id. at 1123.
See id.
ROBERT 0. KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY:

THE WORLD POLITICAL ECONOMY 34-36 (1984).

63. Id. at 34-35.
64. See id. at 34.
65. See id. at 35.

COOPERATION AND DISCORD IN

Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. .L. Rev.

[Vol. 30:1

largely political, the actions of the hegemonic power loom large in
the eyes of the international community. 66 Therefore, actions of
hegemons have significant worldwide ramifications.67
The international community has long recognized the
preemptive right of states to defend themselves against imminent
attack. This right was first
formally recognized in the famous 19th
68
century Caroline case, in which then-U.S. Secretary of State
Daniel Webster stated that any military action based on the
pretext of self-defense must demonstrate the imminence of a
future attack, proportionality of the military action taken in selfdefense, and the necessity of this action. 69 This case has come to
represent the standard, legally recognized doctrine of selfdefense.70 Furthermore, the "imminence" requirement has become
a central tenet in determining the legality of an anticipatory selfdefense claim. 7
The UN Charter memorializes the customary right of selfdefense as an international treaty. Even so, the Charter's
language is facially more restrictive than the Caroline doctrine;
only allowing for military action in self-defense in response to an
armed attack.73 Article 2(4) provides that all states must "refrain in
their international relations from the threat or use of force against
the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in
any manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the [UN].
Article 51 of the UN Charter is one of only two express
exceptions to Article 2(4)'s prohibition on the use of force.
Article 51 states, "Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the
66. Id.
67. W. Michael Reisman & Andrea Armstrong, Past & Future of the Claim of
Preemptive Self-Defense, 100 AM. J. INT'L L. 526 (2006).
. 68. Jennings, supra note 39, at 82 ("It was in the Carolinecase that self-defense was
changed from a political excuse to a legal doctrine.").
69. Letter from Daniel Webster, U.S. Sec'y of State, to Henry S. Fox, Envoy
Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of Her Britannic Majesty (Apr. 24, 1841),
reprintedin 29 BRIT. & FOREIGN ST.PAPERS 1129, 1137-38 (1857).
70. Jennings, supranote 39, at 82.
71. Id. at 89.
72. U.N. Charter art. 51.
73. Id.
74. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4.
75. High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges & Change, A More Secure World: Our
Shared Responsibility, 185, U.N. Doc. A/59/565 (Dec. 2, 2004) [hereinafter A More
Secure World] (noting that the other exception includes "military measures authorized by
the Security Council under Chapter VII"), available at http:/lwww.un.orglsecureworldl
report.pdf.
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inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed
attack occurs against a Member of the [UN], until the Security
Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international
peace and security."76 This article reinforces a state's inalienable
right to defend itself against any armed attack.
In 2003, the UN High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and
Change addressed the restrictive language of Article 51. In the
wake of the U.S. invasion of Iraq, which the United States justified
as an act of preemptive self-defense, the UN Secretary General
appointed the High-Level Panel "to assess current threats to
international peace and security; to evaluate how [the UN's]
existing policies and institutions have done in addressing those
threats; and to make recommendations for strengthening the [UN]
so that it can provide collective security for all in the twenty-first
century."' 8 Specifically, the panel addressed whether the right of
self-defense should be expanded and whether states should have
greater latitude to act unilaterally.79 The panel concluded that,
despite Article 2(4)'s limitations on a state's use of force, "a
threatened State, according to long established international law,
can take military action as long as the threatened attack is
imminent, no other means would deflect it and. the action is
proportionate." 80 This statement incorporates the Caroline
decision, reinforcing the requirement that a threat of attack must
be "imminent" before a state may lawfully take military action in
self-defense. The High-Level Panel declined to discard the
element of "imminence" in a military act of self-defense.8'
The High-Level Panel indirectly addressed the situation with
North Korea, as a state who was. pursuing the acquisition of
nuclear technology with an allegedly hostile intent.82 The panel
acknowledged the danger of hypothetical nuclear acquisition
scenarios:

76. U.N. Charter art. 51, para. 1.
77. A More Secure World, supra note 75, 1 188.
78. Id. Note by the Sec'y Gen. 3.
79. Id. 189.
80. Id. 1 188.
81. See id. T 192 ("We do not favour the rewriting or reinterpretation of Article 51.").
82. See id. $ 188 (addressing the concern that some threats are so great that states
cannot wait until they become imminent to act; "[t]he problem arises where the threat in
question is not imminent but still claimed to be real: for example the acquisition, with
allegedly hostile intent, of nuclear weapons-making capability").
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[W]here the threat in question is not imminent but still claimed
to be real ... the risk to the global order and the norm of non-

intervention on which it continues to be based is simply too
great for the legality of unilateral preventive action, as distinct
from collectively endorsed action, to be accepted. Allowing one
81
to so act is to allow ally.
The UN Secretary General agreed with the High-Level
Panel's statement in a 2005 report. 84 He affirmed, "where threats
are not imminent but latent, the Charter gives full authority to the
' The Secretary General
Security Council to use military force."85
and High Panel's statements may be viewed as a rejection of any
policy of preventative action absent an imminent threat.
IV.

U.S. NUCLEAR POLICIES AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

An examination of U.S. military guidelines acknowledging
the existence of customary international law underscores the
inconsistencies between a purported right to nuclear arms and U.S.
accession to international law. The United States steadfastly
reserves the right to use nuclear weapons in warfare. 86
Furthermore, the United States remains determined to modernize
its nuclear arsenal and maintain its current nuclear stockpile in
contravention of its obligations under the NPT.87
The following section will contrast the U.S. position on the
use of nuclear weapons with its own military policy manuals. Then,
the opinion of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) on the
legality of the use of nuclear weapons will be compared to U.S.
actions concerning the NPT.
A. U.S. Military Policy Regarding the Use of Nuclear Weapons
The United States recognizes the existence of customary
international law, at least so far as military policy is concerned.
83. Id. 91188, 191.
84. See The Secretary-General, In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security
and Human Rights for All, 91126, U.N. Doc. A/59/2005 (Mar. 21, 2005) ("The task is not to
find alternatives to the Security Council as a source of authority [for the use of military
force] but to make it work better.").
85. Id. 1 125.
86. See, e.g., Gov't of the U.S., Written Observations on the Request by the General
Assembly for an Advisory Opinion, 7 CRIM. L.F. 401, 402 (1996) ("In the view of the
United States, there is no general prohibition in conventional or customary international
law on the threat or use of nuclear weapons.").
87. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, supranote 18.
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This is exemplified through examination of official U.S. military
training manuals, which heavily incorporate the customary
international law of war.ss Specifically, the Air Force Manual on
International Law (Air Force Manual) provides for the possibility
that use of a weapon may be illegal under "prohibitions contained
in specific rules of custom and convention" and on "those
prohibitions laid down in the general principles of the law of
war." 89 The Air Force Manual further asserts that customary
international law imposes obligations on all states, including the
United States.9
Moreover, the Air Force Manual recognizes that weapons
which are not expressly banned may still be prohibited under
international law. The manual states, "a new weapon or method of
warfare may be illegal, per se, if it is restricted by international law
including treaty or international custom. The issue is resolved, or
attempted to be resolved, by analogy to weapons or methods
previously determined to be lawful or unlawful." 91 The Air Force
Manual cites biological weapons as an example of a universally
recognized indiscriminate (and therefore illegal) weapon.92
The United States acknowledges the three central principles
of the law of war: necessity, proportionality, and discrimination.93
These principles help determine the legality of using certain
weapons,94 including nuclear weapons.
Under the rule of necessity, a state may only use the
minimum level of force necessary to accomplish a military
objective.9 This rule prohibits the use of any weapon where a less
destructive weapon could achieve the same objective, and further96
prohibits the use of any weapon -incapable of being regulated.
The Commander's Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations
(Commander's Handbook) allows for "[o]nly that degree and kind
88. See, e.g., Charles J'. Moxley, Jr., The Sword in the Mirror - The Lawfulness of
North Korea's Use and Threat of Use Based on the United States' Legitimization of Nuclear
Weapons, 27 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1379, 1435-38 (2004) (detailing U.S. adoption of rules
of proportionality, necessity, and discrimination in various military handbooks).
89. U.S. DEP'T OF THE AIR FORCE, AFP 110-31, INTERNATIONAL LAW CONDUCT OF ARMED CONFLICT AND AIR OPERATIONS 6-1 (1976).

90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

Id. at 1-7.
Id. at 6-7.
Id. at 6-3.
Moxley, supra note 88, at 1380.
Id.
Id. at 1436.
Id.
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of force ... required for the partial or complete submission of the
enemy with97 a minimum expenditure of time, life, and physical
resources."

The rule of proportionality requires that consequences for
combatants, non-combatants, and objects harmed in any military
action be directly proportionate to the objective's importance or
value. 98 The Commander's Handbook affirms "incidental injury or
death to civilians, or collateral damage to civilian objects, during
an attack upon a legitimate military objective" may be allowed,
but the action "should not ...

be excessive in light of the military

advantage anticipated by the attack." 99
The rule of discrimination outlaws using weapons that cannot
differentiate between military and civilian targets.' ° The
Commander's Handbook states, "It is prohibited to launch attacks
against the civilian population . . . .Distinctions must be made
between combatants and noncombatants, to the effect that
noncombatants be spared as much as possible."10'
The United States considers all three principles in
determining the legality of the use of any weapon in its arsenal.
The Air Force Manual considers the following questions relevant:
(1) Can the weapon be delivered accurately to the target;
(2) Would its use necessarily result in excessive injury to
civilians or damage to civilian objects, so as to be termed an
"indiscriminate weapon";
(3) Would its effects be uncontrollable or unpredictable in
space or time as to cause disproportionate injury to civilians or
damage to civilian objects; and
(4) Would its use necessarily cause suffering excessive in
relation to .the military purpose which the weapon serves so as
to violate that prohibition.' 2
The Air Force Manual defines "uncontrollable effects" as
those "which escape in time or space from the control of the user
as to necessarily create risks to civilian persons or objects excessive

97. U.S. DEP'T OF THE NAVY, OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL,
ANNOTATED SUPPLEMENT TO THE COMMANDER'S HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF
NAVAL OPERATIONS 5-4 (1987).
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

Moxley, supra note 88, at 1435.
U.S. DEP'T OF THE NAVY, supra note 97, at 8-5.
Moxley, supra note 88, at 1438.
U.S. DEP'T OF THE NAVY, supra note 97, at 8-1.
U.S. DEP'T OF THE AIR FORCE,supra, note 89, at 6-7.
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in relation to the military advantage anticipated."'0'3 The Air Force
Manual contextualizes the "uncontrollable effects" of biological
weapons by noting their indiscriminate nature. It specifically
points to the tendency of biological warfare to affect not only the
enemy's civilian population, but also the civilian populations of
surroundingstates.'

Consequently, the Air Force Manual's articulation of the
principles of necessity, proportionality, and discrimination seems
to undermine rather than support the right asserted by the United
States to use nuclear weapons.
B. U.S. Defense of the Right to Use Nuclear Weapons
U.S. reliance on the theory of nuclear deterrence demands
that the United States claim a right to use nuclear weapons under
international law. 15 The theory of deterrence has driven U.S.6
national security policy since the inception of the nuclear bomb.'
Recently, the Bush administration has bolstered the United States'
longstanding policy of deterrence.) ° The concept of deterrence is
based on the threat that the United States will not hesitate to use
its nuclear arsenal in the face of any serious threat to its national
security.'O' In support of its policy of deterrence, the United States
claims no international law prevents the use of nuclear weapons,' °9
despite the contrary positions taken in the U.S. military manuals
discussed above.
The U.S. advisory letter to the ICJ outlined the U.S. claim for
the legality of nuclear weapons use." ° In 1996, the ICJ responded
to a request from the UN General Assembly to provide an
advisory opinion regarding the question: "Is the threat or use of
103. Id. at 6-3 (emphasis in original).
104. Id.
105. Gov't of the U.S., supra note 86, at 405.

106. Cf. Donald H. Rumsfeld, Foreword to NUCLEAR POSTURE REVIEW REPORT
(2002) ("As a result of this review, the U.S. will no longer plan size, or sustain its forces as
though Russia presented merely a smaller version of the threat posed by the former Soviet
Union."), available at http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/policy/dod/npr.htm.
107. Id. (noting that President Bush's direction "to transform America's military ...
puts in motion a major change in our approach to the role of nuclear offensive forces in
our deterrent strategy and presents the blueprint for transforming our strategic posture.").
108. NUCLEAR POSTURE REVIEW REPORT 7 (2002) ("Nuclear weapons play a critical
role in the defense capabilities of the United States, its allies and friends. They provide
credible military options to deter a wide range of threats, including WMD and large-scale
conventional military force.").
109. Gov't of the U.S., supra note 86, at 402, 405.
110. Id. at 401.
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nuclear weapons in any circumstance permitted under
international law?""' The United States and many other countries
submitted letters to the ICJ concerning their positions on the use
of nuclear weapons. The U.S. letter advises that the use of nuclear
weapons should be found legal under international law."2
The U.S. letter rejects a per se rule banning the use of nuclear
weapons."' The United States proclaims it has never signed any
treaty banning the use of nuclear weapons, and, therefore, it
cannot be banned from using nuclear weapons." 4 Moreover, the
United States argues that customary law cannot be read to ban the
use of nuclear weapons since the United States has used them in
the past."5 The letter further proclaims that there has been no
international consensus on a customary law ban of nuclear
weapons.",'
The U.S. letter provides a cursory assessment of the binding
principles of international law. It concedes "that the use of nuclear
weapons is subject to the law of armed conflict, including the rules
of proportionality, necessity, and discrimination, moderation,
civilian immunity, neutrality, and humanity."..7 The United States
contends that the elements of proportionality and necessity must
be considered under the specific circumstances of a situation in
which the use of nuclear force is contemplated. 8 This position
advocating ad hoc evaluation, allows nuclear threats and their
possible use to be freely incorporated into U.S. military policy."9
As any decision to use nuclear weapons would be made under
immense pressure and in a short period of time, "ad hoc
evaluation" is a policy of presumptive lawfulness.2
Most importantly, the U.S. position hinges on the contention
that modern nuclear weapons are able to discriminate between

111. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J.
226 (July 8).
112. Gov't of the U.S., supra note 86, at 401.
113. Id. at 402, 405.
114 Id. at 407 ("We are aware of no international agreement - and certainly none to
which the United States is a Party - that contains a general prohibition on the use of
nuclear weapons.").
115. Id. at 406.
116. Id. at 406-07.
117. Moxley, supranote 88, at 1433.
118. Id. at 1435-36.
119. Id. at 1442.
120. Id. at 1442.
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civilian targets and military targets."' No evidence has been
presented by any nation that the radiation effects of nuclear
weapons can be controlled. 2 The assumption that nuclear
weapons can be controlled serves to characterize nuclear weapons
as any other conventional weapon. 3 However, the assumption of
controllability does not comport with U.S. acknowledgment that
the effects of biological weapons cannot be controlled. If nuclear
effects can be controlled, and nuclear weapons operate under the
same laws as conventional weapons, then North Korea's pursuit,
possession, and use of nuclear weapons should be perfectly
acceptable under international law. 5
C. The ICJ Ruling on the Use of Nuclear Weapons
The ICJ ruled inconclusively on the question of whether all
uses of nuclear weapons could be banned.1 26 In a seven-to-seven
opinion decided by the vote of the president, the majority stated:
[T]he threat or use of nuclear weapons would generally be
contrary to the rules of international law applicable in armed
conflict, and in particular the principles and rules of
humanitarian law; [h]owever, in view of the current state of
international law, and of the elements of fact at its disposal, the
Court cannot conclude definitively whether the threat or use of
nuclear weapons would be lawful or unlawful in an extreme
circumstance of self-defence,
in which the very survival of a
127
State would be at stake.
The court's indecision was due to the lack of evidence
regarding the effects of modern low-yield tactical nuclear
weapons. Although low yield nuclear weapons do release lower
amounts of radiation, the spread of this radiation is still
uncontrollable. 29 Furthermore, by the U.S. Army's own admission,
the risk of nuclear war escalation compounds the risk of the spread

121. Gov't of the U.S., supra note 86, at 416.
122. Moxley, supra note 88, at 1450-51.
123. Id. at 1448.
124. See id. at 1440.
125. See id. at 1448.
126. Id.
127. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J.
at 268 (July 8).
128. Moxley, supra note 88, at 1449.
129. Id. at 1450-51.
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of radiation.'- ° As the United States' Doctrine for Joint Nuclear
Operations states, "[t]here can be no assurances that a conflict
involving [WMDs] could be controllable or would be short of
duration. 13' Indeed, the ICJ opinion notes that the use of nuclear
weapons could result in massive damage to neutral countries, even
"the possible extinction of all life."' 3
The ICJ failed to conclude unanimously that all states must
work towards disarmament.133 The court found, according to
Article VI of the NPT, "an obligation to pursue in good faith and
bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament
in all aspects under strict and effective international control."" ICJ
President Mohammed Bedajoui declared nuclear weapons to be
the "ultimate evil" and emphasized that the obligation for nuclear
disarmament had assumed customary force.'35
D. The United States and the NuclearNon-Proliferation Treaty
The NPT has functioned as the central basis for nuclear nonproliferation in the international community.136 Drafted in 1968,
the NPT boasts extensive international membership, and in 1995
its obligations were extended permanently. 137 Furthermore, the ICJ
recognized the treaty as an important instrument in achieving
nuclear disarmament.4
Non-proliferation, disarmament, and the right to peaceful
139
uses of nuclear energy constitute the three pillars of the NPT.
Under the non-proliferation pillar, the five recognized nuclear
states agree "not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce" any
non-nuclear
in acquiring
nuclear "manufacture,"
weapons. 14° In turn,
the nonnuclear statesstate
agree
not to "receive,"
or "acquire"

130. Id. at 1454.
131. JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 3-12, DOCTRINE FOR JOINT NUCLEAR
OPERATIONS, at 1-6 (1995).
132. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. at 375, 409.
133. Id. at 268.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. See generally Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 18.
137. Id.
138. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. at 268.
139. Chamundeeswari Kuppuswamy, Is the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Shaking
at its Foundations? Stock Taking After the 2005 NPT Review Conference, 11 J. CONFLICT
& SEC. L. 141,142 (2006).
140. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 18, art. 1.
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nuclear weapons.' The disarmament pillar requires all parties to
''pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating
to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to
nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete
disarmament under strict and effective international control.' ' .2
The non-proliferation pillar is open to interpretation. For
example, the United States views non-proliferation as the
prevention of new states from obtaining nuclear capability. 4 1 Many
non-nuclear states argue against nuclear deterrence as a viable
military strategy, and point out that the continued development of
new nuclear technology only induces non-nuclear states to acquire
nuclear capabilities.' " Furthermore, a policy of preemptive attack
can be viewed as additional pressure to develop nuclear
weapons.141
The Bush administration has renewed the U.S. strategy of
nuclear deterrence in the post-9/11 era. In the 2002 Nuclear
Posture Review, the U.S. Department of Defense presented a
deterrence strategy that was focused on developing "[o]ffensive
strike systems (both nuclear and non-nuclear); [d]efenses (both
active and passive); and [a] revitalized defense infrastructure that
will provide new capabilities.' 46 The Nuclear Posture Review
notes the significant U.S. investment in modernizing its nuclear
arsenal.' 47 Notably, the Review does not mention any effort to
disarm, as required by Article VI of the NPT. 148
While emphasizing the importance of the nuclear nonproliferation agreements by other states, the United States ignores
its disarmament obligations under NPT's third pillar.'49 The logical
incentive for non-nuclear states to sign this treaty is the hope that
nuclear states that join the treaty will shift their focus away from
nuclear weapons as a security strategy and move towards the
elimination of nuclear weapons altogether. '" This incentive,
141. Id. art. 2.
142. Id. art. 6.
143. Kuppuswamy, supranote 139, at 142.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Rumsfeld, supra note 106.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Patricia Hewitson, Comment, Nonproliferation & Reduction of Nuclear Weapons:
Risks of Weakening the Multilateral Nuclear Nonproliferation Norm, 21 BERKELEY J.
INT'L L. 405,486 (2003).
150. Id.at 473.
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however, is undermined as nuclear states continue to develop
nuclear weapons technology. The most obvious disarmament
commitment currently available to United States is the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)."' President Bush has
celebrated Libya's recent commitment to the CTBT.'52 Yet, when
asked about United States' adherence to the CTBT and its
obligation to eliminate nuclear weapons, a Bush administration
official candidly stated, "[w]e're not for that... 3
Bush's open support of India's civilian nuclear technology
further weakens the NPT" In July 2005, President Bush declared
he would do all in his power to change international rules to allow
for the trade of civilian nuclear technology with India, 55 a country
that has refused to join the NPT and has acknowledged its
possession of nuclear weapons. 56 Despite India's refusal to sign the
NPT, President Bush and Congress have rewarded India with the
promise of nuclear technology,'" thereby sidestepping the NPT
and accordingly diminishing its legitimacy. On the other hand,
Iran, an NPT signatory, has not been granted the same access to
civilian nuclear technology."158
President Bush's policy is that nuclear weapons are not the
problem. Instead, "rogue states" such as North Korea are the
problem. Current U.S. security strategy emphasizes preemptive
actions the United States may take to ensure compliance with nonproliferation mechanisms like the NPT.159 The "rogue states,"
however, are not the sole proliferation threat. The mere existence
and possession of nuclear weapons creates the threat. 16° As long as
nuclear states openly incorporate and legitimize nuclear weapons

151. G.A. Res. 50/245, U.N. Doc. A/RES/50/245 (Sept. 24, 1996).
152. George W. Bush, U.S. Pres., Libya Pledges to Dismantle WMD Programs,
Remarks by the President (Dec. 19, 2003), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/
releases/2003/12/20031219-9.html.
153. Perkovich, supra note 40, at 7.
154. U.S. Dep't of State, Congress Passes U.S.-India Civilian Nuclear Cooperation
Bill: Passage Secures Administration Goal with World's Largest Democracy, Dec. 9, 2006,
http://www.america.gov/st/washfile-english/2006/December/20061208173518adynned0.
1525385.html [hereinafter Congress Passes U.S.-India Civilian Nuclear Cooperation Bill].
155. Id.
156. Perkovich, supra note 40, at 3.
157. Congress Passes U.S.-India Civilian Nuclear Cooperation Bill, supra note 154.
158. Kuppuswamy, supra note 139, at 145, 149.
159. Richard Sokolsky, Demystifying the Nuclear Posture Review, SURVIVAL, Autumn
2002, at 137.
160. See id.
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as a security strategy, other states will want their own nuclear
weapons.
The failure of the United States to recognize the benefits of
upholding international norms is problematic. For example, the
U.S. assertion that "rogue162•states" such as North
Korea do not
.
follow international norms ignores the compliance of most states,
including necessary allies and advocates that support nonproliferation.' 63 The potential success of the six-party talks with
North Korea that resulted in the February 2007 agreement further
highlights the U.S. need for nuclear strategy allies.' 64 Yet, the
United States delegitimized the NPT and set an example that
states may ignore NPT requirements. After reviewing the 2002
Nuclear Posture Review, current State Department Policy Planner
Richard Sokolsky acknowledged., "The most serious consequences
of the [2002 Nuclear Posture Review] are the diplomatic and
geopolitical problems it causes for America's standing and image
in the world, rather than its direct effects
on international security
16
and the prospects for war and peace.
V. NORTH KOREA'S DEVELOPMENT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS:
TAKING ITS CUE FROM THE UNITED STATES?

North Korea's pursuit of nuclear weapons exemplifies the
unintended consequences of U.S. legitimization of nuclear
weapons and preemptive self-defense. The dual threats of nuclear
weapons and preemptive attack may deter those parties whose
vital interests include maintaining the international status quo,
protecting their citizens, and retaining power. A policy of
deterrence, however, may only serve to motivate rivals, such as
Kim Jong-il, in their pursuit of nuclear weapons. Already on the
offensive against the United States, Kim Jong-il has little to lose by
pursuing a nuclear agenda. Thus, he may view nuclear weapons as
161. See Hewitson, supra note 149, at 493-94; see also Sokolsky, supra note 159, at 137.
162. See generally Press Statement, Richard Boucher, U.S. Dep't of State, supra note 7
(stating that "North Korea has a program to enrich uranium for nuclear weapons in
violation of the Agreed Framework and other agreements").
163. See Hewitson, supra note 149, at 407.
164. Ja Young Elizabeth Kim, Comment, The Agreement After the Six-Party Talks: Are
There No Alternatives to the "Modified" Version of the 1994 Geneva Agreed Framework?An Analysis of the Newly-Adopted Framework and Its Significance for the Nuclear
ProliferationIssues Relating to North Korea, 21 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 177, 196, 198

(2007).
165. Sokolsky, supra note 159, at 144.

Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.

[Vol. 30:1

North Korea's best chance to avoid American attack and to
reinforce his self-proclaimed position as the "Great Leader" of his
country.
A. Background
North Korea is among the world's poorest nations.'6 Its
economy is in shambles, and many of its people are starving. A
famine in the 1990s caused the death of at least one-tenth of the
country's population.'" Consequently, North Korea requires
foreign assistance to feed its people, and it has received aid from
the United States, China, South Korea, and other states.' In 2002,
the UN estimated that a third of North Koreans received
government food aid, and that half of the population was
malnourished. 7 '
North Korea's leader, Kim Jong-il, is an enigmatic figure
known for his eccentricity. The government-run media often
aggrandizes his accomplishments.
Accordingly, he has been
credited with writing three operas and personally designing the
tallest building in North Korea. Yet, while his intelligence and
sanity have been questioned,"' former Secretary of State Madeline
Albright found him competent and well-informed during her 2000
visit to North Korea.'
North Korea is a communist totalitarian government, and is
accused of being one of the most notorious human rights
violators. 75' All North Korean media is state-controlled, and it is
reported that over 200,000 people are being held as political
prisoners." 6 The UN has condemned North Korea for its human
166. See May Lee, Famine May Have Killed 2 Million in North Korea, CNN, Aug. 19,
1998, http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/asiapcf/9808/19/nkorea.famine/.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Country Profile: North Korea, BBC NEWS, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/
country-profiles/1131421.stm#facts (last visited Feb. 16, 2008).
170. See generally U.N. Food & Agric. Org. [FAO], Special Report: FAO/WFP Crop
and Food Supply Assessment Mission to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, 5.2
(Oct. 28, 2002), available at http://www.fao.org/docrep/005/y7843E/y7843E00.htm.
171. Country Profile: North Korea, supra note 169.
172. Id.
173. Id.; see also Interview by Jim Lehrer with Madeleine Albright, U.S. Sec'y of State,
on Newshour with Jim Lehrer (Oct. 30, 2000), available at http://www.pbs.org/newshour/
bb/international/july-dec0O/albright_10-30.html.
174. Interview by Jim Lehrer with Madeleine AIbright, supra note 173.
175. Country Profile: North Korea, supranote 169.
176. Id.

2008]

U.S. Security Strategy

rights abuses, which include torture, political imprisonment, and
slave labor."
North Korea has a reported available military manpower of
about 12 million, and an annual average available military
manpower of about 400,00.178 Furthermore, it is estimated North
Korea has acquired enough plutonium to make nuclear missiles
that could reach Japan or South Korea. 79
The Korean War is considered a Cold War proxy battle
between China and the United States.' 8° In 1950, North Korea
invaded South Korea in an attempt to reunify the Korean
Peninsula. In response, the United States convinced the UN
Security Council to vote in favor of sending military aid to South
Korea."n The Security Council recommended that all UN members
assist the U.S.-led force to restore peace to the Korean
Peninsula. 18' The war eventually ended in a stalemate, and the
Korean Peninsula remained divided into two separate nations."' In
1953, the two sides signed an armistice agreement but did not sign
an official peace treaty.' 8' As a result, North Korea and South
Korea are still technically at war today. 86
Since the armistice, the relationship between the United
States and North Korea has been plagued with virulent rhetoric
and tension.' 7 Moreover, North Korea has often referred to the
South Korean government as a U.S. "puppet.""

177. Id.
178. GlobalFirePower.com,
North
Korea
Military
Strength
Statistics,
http://www.globalfirepower.com/countrydetail.asp?countryid=22 (last visited Feb. 16,
2008).
179. DAVID ALBRIGHT & PAUL BRANNAN, INST. FOR SCI. & INT'L SEC. [ISIS], THE
NORTH KOREAN

PLUTONIUM

STOCK

1, 8

(2007),

available at http://www.isis-

online.org/publications/ dprk/DPRKplutoniumFEB.pdf.
180. See
Korean
War,
BRITANNICA
ONLINE
ENCYCLOPEDIA,
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/322419/Korean-War (last visited Feb. 16,
2008).
181. Dick K. Nanto, North Korea: Chronology of Provocations,1950-2003, at 3 (Cong.
Research Serv. [CRS] Report RL30004, 2003), available at http://www.fas.org/man/crs/
RL30004.pdf.
182. S.C. Res. 84, U.N. Doc. S/1588 (July 7, 1950).
183. Id.
184. See Korean War, supra note 180.
185. Nanto, supra note 181, at 3.
186. Country Profile:North Korea, supra note 169.
187. See Nanto, supra note 181, at 3-5, 10, 16, 17, 20, 24, 25.
188. North Korean Radio Denies Secret Agents Arrested in South, BBC NEWS, Nov. 24,
1997, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/world/monitoring/34177.stm.
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B. North Korea's Nuclear History
The Soviet Union first gave North Korea nuclear assistance in
the 1950s, but later pressured North Korea into signing the NPT in
1985. 89' In 1989, the United States discovered that North Korea was
developing a nuclear facility in the town of Yongbyon.' Despite
this finding, North Korea did not allow the International Atomic
Energy
Agency (IAEA) inspections, as required by the NPT, until
T
1992.

During that same year, the Joint Declaration of
Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula (Joint Declaration) was
signed in 1992.'9 This agreement provided that neither North nor
South Korea would engage in "testing, manufacture, production,
acceptance, possession, stockpiling, deployment and use of nuclear
weapons.' '93 However, in 1994, North Korea expelled IAEA
investigators and threatened to "begin reprocessing 8,000 spent
fuel rods from a nuclear power plant., 19 4 Although the United
States made plans to attack North Korea,' 9' in 1994, former U.S.
President Jimmy Carter went on a dramatic peace-keeping mission
to save the Joint Declaration.1 9 His efforts resulted in the Agreed
Framework between the United States and North Korea. 97 Under
this agreement, North Korea agreed to convert its nuclear reactors
into light water reactors, continue as a party to the NPT, and allow
IAEA nuclear inspections in exchange for oil shipments and
security assurances from the United States.'98

189. George Bunn & John B. Rhinelander, NPT Withdrawal: Time for the Security
Council to Step In, ARMS CONTROL TODAY, May 2005, http://www.armscontrol.org/act/
2005_05/BunnRhinelander.asp.
190. See generally Walter Pincus, N. Korea Nuclear Conflict Has Deep Roots, WASH.
POST, Oct. 5, 2006, at A16.
191. Id.
192. Joint Declaration on Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, S. Korea-N.
Korea, Jan. 20, 1992, 33 I.L.M. 569.
193.

Id.

194. Jimmy Carter, U.S.-North Korea War Seems "Strong Possibility," USA TODAY,
Sept. 1, 2003, at 11.
195. Jung Wook Sik, The U.S. Kept Up Secret Plans to Attack North Korea with Nukes
in Violation of the 1994 Geneva Agreed Framework, http://www.kimsoft.com/2002/genevano.htm (last visited Feb. 16, 2008).
196. The Carter Center, North Korea, http:/lwww.cartercenter.orglcountries/northkorea.html (last visited Feb. 16, 2008).
197. Id.; Agreed Framework to Negotiate Resolution of the Nuclear Issue on the
Korean Peninsula, S. Korea-U.S., Oct. 21, 1994, 34 I.L.M. 603 (1995), available at
http://www.kedo.orglpdfs/AgreedFramework.pdf.
198. Id.
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Eight years later, in January 2002, President Bush declared
North Korea to be part of the "axis of evil" and a threat to U.S.
security.'9 Later that year, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State James
Kelly claimed that a North Korean diplomat had disclosed North
Korean plans to pursue a nuclear program in violation of the
Agreed Framework.' Although North Korean leaders disputed
this claim, the United States suspended its oil shipments. 1° In
response, North Korea expelled nuclear inspectors, withdrew from
the NPT, and effectively destroyed the, Agreed Framework.2
North Korea accused the United States of threatening the country
with preemptive nuclear attack and blockades. 23 Further, it denied
having a nuclear program and stated that it was the United States
that violated the Agreed Framework when it suspended the oil
shipments under false pretenses.' Months later, North Korea
announced it would withdraw from the Korean Denuclearization
Pact, its final remaining non-proliferation agreement." '
In August 2003, North Korea agreed to six-party talks (which
included the United States) regarding ending its nuclear weapons
program'0 6 When North Korea announced that it possessed
nuclear weapons, however, the talks ended. 7 In October 2006,
despite UN protests, North Korea claimed it had conducted its
first nuclear weapons test at an underground site.2°8 Further
investigation revealed that, although the claim was likely true, the

199. Country Profile: North Korea, supra note 169.
200. Nanto, supra note 181, at 24.
201. Foster-Carter, supra note 13.
202. Id.
203. Shenon, supra note 12; Detailed Report on Circumstances of DPRK's Withdrawal
from NPT, KOREAN CENT. NEWS AGENCY, Jan. 22, 2003, http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/
2003/200301/news01/23.htm; Text of North Korea's Statement on NPT Withdrawal,
KOREAN

CENT. NEWS AGENCY, Jan. 10,

2003,

http://cns.miis.edu/research/korea/

nptstate.htm; North Korea: Statement on Pullout, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 2003, at A7.
204. Detailed Report on Circumstances of DPRK's Withdrawal from NPT, supra note
203.
205. DPRK KCNA's 12 May "Detailed Report" Says U.S. "Ruptured" Denuclearization
Process,KOREAN CENT. NEWS AGENCY, May 12, 2003 (Foreign Broad. Info. Serv. [FBIS]
trans.), http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/dprk/nuke/dprk051203.html.
206. James Brooke, U.S. and North Korea Announce Accord on Wider Atom Talks,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 2,2003, at A2.
207. Paul Kerr, North Korea, U.S. Meet; Pyongyang Said to Claim Nukes, ARMS
CONTROL TODAY, May 2003, available at http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2003-05/
nkoreanews_ may03.asp.
208. North Korea Claims Nuclear Test, supra note 11.
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test may have been unsuccessful because the registered seismic
waves seemed too small to have been produced by a nuclear test.'N
Surprisingly, on February 13, 2007, North Korea and the
other members of the six-party talks (United States, Russia, South
Korea, China, and Japan) agreed on a deal to shut down North
Korea's nuclear facility, normalize U.S.-DPRK relations, and
secure permanent peace on the Korean peninsula. 20" The United
States again agreed to send fuel in exchange for North Korea
closing its nuclear facility, but under this agreement (as opposed to
the original Agreed Framework) North Korea would receive food
aid only after the facility was closed."' In turn, the United States
agreed to unfreeze a Macau bank account with $25 million in
North Korean funds. The United States gave North Korea an
April 14, 2007 deadline to shut down its facility. 213 The deadline
passed without North Korea shutting down its nuclear facility. 2"
North Korea finally began to shut down the facility on July 16,
2007. " Negotiations are ongoing, but the parties have not
addressed North Korea's existing nuclear arsenal, which remains
an area of major contention for both sides.1 6
C. North Korean Justificationof Its Nuclear Pursuits
North Korea has long proclaimed that its nuclear pursuit is
founded upon its fear of the United States.2"7 In 1957, the United
States announced it could wage nuclear war upon North Korea
from U.S. military bases in South Korea."' The Bush
administration has affirmed its commitment to the potential use of
nuclear weapons in defending South Korea. 29 North Korea cites
the U.S. nuclearization of South Korea as a continued security
threat, and a violation of the 1992 Joint Declaration of the
209. North Korean Test "Went Wrong," U.S. Official Says, CNN, Oct. 11, 2006i
http://edition.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/asiapcfllO/lO/korea.nuclear.test/index.html.
210. See Foster-Carter, supranote 13.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Jason T. Shaplen & James Laney, Kim Jong-il's Last Card, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8,
2007, at A19.
217. See generallyMoxley, supra note 88.
218. Id. at 1411.
219. Bill Gertz, Nukes Option by U.S. in Korea, WASH. TIMES, Nov. 18, 2003, at Al;
see also NUCLEAR POSTURE REVIEW REPORT, supra note 108.
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Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.22 In 2003, thenSecretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld said the U.S. defense of
South Korea
includes the "continued provision of a nuclear
, 221
umbrella.
North Korea also justifies its nuclear pursuit for economic
reasons. The DPRK argues that it cannot deter an enemy such as
the United States with conventional weapons.2 Under this theory,
nuclear weapons would protect North Korea without having to
fund a full military, allowing the DPRK to spend its economic
resources on the support of its malnourished population.223
Because the United States clearly has more money to spend on
weapons and military• troops, the only
credible deterrent available
224
to North Korea is a nuclear bomb. Ironically, the United States
used a similar rationale during the Cold War.2 The Soviet Union
was allowed to create a superior conventional force while the
226
United States relied on its nuclear force as a deterrent.
Recent aggressive U.S. rhetoric has led North Korea to
believe that the stage is being set for a future attack. As evidence,
North Korea cites President Bush's repeated accusations that
North Korea is a rogue nation developing WMDs.2 27 The United
States took preemptive action against Iraq under a similar
rationale: repeated violations of UN sanctions, human rights
violations, possession of WMDs, the irrationality of Saddam
Hussein, and a long-standing rhetoric of hostility towards the
United States. 8 It follows that the United States could apply the
same rationale to North Korea based on the actions of the North
Korean government, even without exaggerated evidence.
North Korea's fears of the United States exaggerating or
distorting evidence to suit its "axis of evil" rhetoric may be well
founded. Recent evidence suggests the United States may have
exaggerated its claims that North Korea violated the 1994 Agreed
Framework. 29 Never a popular agreement with U.S. conservatives,
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.

Moxley, supra note 88, at 1386.
Gertz, supra note 219, at Al.
See Moxley, supranote 88, at 1382, 1394.
See id. at 1394.
See id. at 1382.
See id. at 1381.
See id. at 1381-82.
Id. at 1393, 1408.
See id. at 1412-14.
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it is now widely believed that the United States distorted the
DPRK diplomat's claim that North Korea had the right to develop
nuclear weapons."3 At the time, the United States presented a
flimsy, worst-case scenario of the DPRK's nuclear program as
incontrovertible proof to exaggerate the dangers of North Korea's
government (just as it did when presenting the dangers posed by
Iraq)."3 After publicizing North Korea's alleged assertion of its
nuclearization rights, the United States characterized North Korea
as an international menace. During this time, the Agreed
Framework unraveled, with both countries blaming the other for
the failure.232 Considering the exaggerated evidence used to
support preemptive war against Iraq, another fellow "axis of evil"
state, it is not unreasonable to believe that the United States could
make the same decision to depose an anti-American regime in
North Korea.
Thus far, the U.S. policy of preemptive self-defense as a
deterrent seems to have backfired in the case of North Korea. If
anything, this U.S. policy has encouraged North Korea to pursue
nuclear capability. For example, in withdrawing from the NPT in
2003, a North Korean official stated, "The bloody lesson of the war
in Iraq for the world is that only when a country has physical
deterrent forces and massive military deterrent forces that are
capable of overwhelmingly defeating any attack by state-of-the-art
weapons, can it prevent
war and defend its independence and
233
national security.,

Arguably, the Bush Doctrine could inspire other nuclear
states to take their own preemptive military action. In turn, nonnuclear states are provoked to acquire nuclear weapons secretly,
hoping to discourage preemptive military actions against them.
This counter-effect is exemplified by the North Korean Foreign
Ministry's response to the escalation of rhetoric following Bush's
"axis of evil" speech: "The United States says that after Iraq, we
are next ... but we have our own counter-measures.
Preemptive
2'
attacks are not the exclusive right of the U.S. 14
230. See id.
231. Id. at 110.
232. See Jonathan D. Pollack, The United States, North Korea, and the End of the
Agreed Framework, NAVAL WAR C. REV., Summer 2003.
233. DPRK KCNA's 12 May "Detailed Report" Says U.S. "Ruptured"
DenuclearizationProcess,supra note 205.
234. Jonathan Watts, N Korea Threatens U.S. with First Strike, GUARDIAN, Feb. 6,
2003, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2003/feb/06/usa.northkorea.
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VI. CONCLUSION

In an effort to preserve its hegemony, U.S. policies of nuclear
legitimacy and preemptive self-defense are creating a dangerous
double standard. The longer the United States continues these
policies, the more entrenched they will become, both within the
U.S. military and in the international community. Once the central
architect of international law, the United States and its apparent
reliance on a double standard serves to invalidate the current
international system, its customs, and its capacity to promote
universal values. Moreover, by violating norms of international
law, the United States reduces its own capacity to advance
American interests."' A world without international law becomes a
world that is much more difficult to control.
In the aftermath of the Iraq invasion and in light of the
revelation that Iraq did not possess WMDs, the Bush
administration has been forced to de-emphasize its preemption
doctrine. In the 2006 National Security Strategy, it was widely
touted that, while maintaining its right to preemptive self-defense,
the Bush administration had decided to emphasize it as a last
resort.16 Ideally, the Bush Doctrine serves to deter states from
attempting to acquire WMDs and allows the United States to
attack any rogue state or terrorist who remains undeterred. The
situations in Iraq and Afghanistan, however, have highlighted the
difficulty of replacing governments once they are removed.
North Korea has plainly stated that, because of the U.S.
threat of preemptive attack, it seeks to acquire nuclear weapons as
its only method of deterrence.237 The DPRK even went so far as to
test a nuclear bomb.238 Despite this revelation, the United States
has declined to attack North Korea for the following reasons. First,
the Bush Doctrine has kept the U.S. military fully engaged in the
Middle East. 239 It is questionable whether the United States has the
military strength to concurrently conduct a large-scale operation in
North Korea. Second, and perhaps most importantly, the U.S.
invasion in Iraq, which was based on faulty intelligence and ran
235. Hewitson, supra note 149, at 494.
236. See THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
23 (2006) [hereinafter 2006 NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY], available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss/2OO6/nss2OO6.pdf.
237.
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contrary to both international norms and consensus, has weakened
the U.S. government's credibility both domestically and abroad. 240
The Bush Doctrine led to the February 2007 agreement which
is remarkably similar to the Agreed Framework scuttled by the
administration in 2002.24' Domestically, the Bush administration
has lost much of its political clout, and U.S. reputation abroad
could suffer even more damage if the United States preemptively
attacks North Korea. In light of this situation, the Bush
administration has altered its rigid philosophy following the
collapse of the Agreed Framework. According to former UN
Ambassador John Bolton, who was appointed by President Bush,
a deal was brokered that "contradicts fundamental premises of the
42 2
president's policy he's been following for the past six years.,
Considering this deal and the 2006 National Security Strategy's deemphasis on preemptive self-defense, 243 it is possible the Bush
administration is beginning to acknowledge the necessity of
compromise and international diplomacy.
This development is important because the Bush
administration's policies of preemption and nuclear legitimization
have revealed that, without international support, even a nation as
powerful as the United States cannot control the actions of every
rogue nation. Instead, in order to achieve security against nuclear
weapons, all nations must persistently implement treaties, customs,
and principles established to control nuclear proliferation and,
ultimately, to eliminate nuclear weapons altogether. Ironically, the
Bush administration finds international norms applicable in other
areas. As a defense official recently stated, "[w]orldwide moral
battles can be fought and won .... [n]o decent person any more ...
supports or excuses slave trading, piracy, or genocide.
No decent
2
person should support or excuse terrorism either., "
It is possible for the United States to regain international
legitimacy and support by strengthening the international
nonproliferation regime. Making nonproliferation a prominent
goal would arguably create international goodwill and significantly
240. Id. at 3-4
241. Bernard Gwertzman, Samore: N. Korean Deal a 'Wise Compromise' for Bush,
COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, Feb. 13, 2007, http://www.cfr.org/publication/12636/
samore.html.
242. Edward Cody, Tentative Nuclear Deal Struck with North Korea: Steps to
DisarmamentDrafted in 6-Party Talks, WASH. POST, Feb. 13, 2007, at A16.
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pressure states such as Iran and North Korea to end their nuclear
programs. The United States could begin by taking steps towards
greater compliance with the NPT. A serious U.S. nonproliferation
emphasis could serve to motivate all states to stop the spread of
nuclear weapons and create a global norm of non-proliferation.

